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Abstract
Section 133 of the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA), which took effect on July 1, 2010, requires academic 
institutions to supply textbook information on their courses at the time students register for the courses. One 
of the rationales for this provision is that it gives students extra time to purchase the textbook from suppliers 
other than a college or university textbook store. It is argued that this should put a downward pressure on 
prices in the textbook store. This paper constructs a theoretical model to check the validity of this argument. 
The findings indicate that this policy does not necessarily reduce textbook prices. On the contrary, under some 
conditions the textbook prices in college and university bookstores could increase. Given that students and 
parents often complain about the cost of textbook prices, examination of this issue is well-warranted and has 
important implications for consumers and policymakers.
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1. Introduction
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) report [1] found that textbook prices increased twice 
the rate of inflation between 1984 and 2004. According to the report, textbook prices in the United 
States increased at a rate of 6% per year, while average price levels in the economy rose at a rate 
of 3% per year during the 20-year time period. The textbook price increases have important pol-
icy implications because full-time students spend around $1000 annually on books (see [2, 3]). 
Furthermore, higher textbook price levels increase the overall cost of attending college, and there-
fore, put a greater strain of federal, university and college budgets because financial aid calculations 
incorporate the cost of textbooks [4]. Thus, examination of textbook prices is well-warranted.
The reasons for textbook price increases include lack of downstream competition, price 
discrimination, frequent publication of new editions, misalignment of professor and student incen-
tives and bundling traditional textbooks with various instructional supplements (see [1, 4–8]). It 
is also important to note that some researchers suggest that textbook price levels are not related 
to monopoly pricing, retail cost differences or impediments to entry [9]. While different propos-
als to reduce the cost of college textbooks were suggested, section 133 of the Higher Education 
Opportunity Act (HEOA), which took effect on July 1, 2010, requires academic institutions to supply 
textbook information on their courses at the time students register for a course [10]. Prior to the 
act, many students found out which textbooks were used in their classes only in the beginning of 
the semester. Since many students register for courses a couple of months prior to the beginning 
of the semester, this provision of the act gives students extra time to purchase textbooks from sup-
pliers other than a college or university textbook store. Thus, it could be argued that the act puts a 
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downward pressure on textbook prices because the college and university bookstores face greater 
competition from online book suppliers. This paper constructs a theoretical model to check the valid-
ity of this rationale for the HEOA. 
The findings indicate that the textbook provision of the HEOA does not necessarily reduce 
textbook prices and that price levels in the college and university bookstores could increase under 
certain conditions. The intuition for this result is that the act reduces students’ switching costs to 
alternative suppliers. Then, price sensitive students are more likely to switch to an alternative sup-
plier, such as internet textbook suppliers, while price insensitive students are likely to stick with the 
local textbook supplier. Then, it could be profitable for the local textbook store to increase its price 
in order to maximize its profits because the store is mostly serving price insensitive students. This is 
a new result since previous literature mostly studied how used book sales influence new textbook 
prices (see [6–8]) or how free examination copies provided to professors influence textbook prices 
(see [11, 12]) and did not investigate how HEOA could affect textbook prices in the college and 
university bookstores.  
2. Model
Let consumer i ’s valuation of a textbook be vi, where vi is a random variable with a cumulative prob-
ability distribution function F (v ). The domain of F (v ) is [0, v max]. Assume that F (v ) is twice continu-
ously differentiable and that F 9(v) 5 f (v ) . 0. Let PS denote the textbook price at a local bookstore 
and PI denote the textbook price at an alternative supplier. There is an additional cost associated 
with buying the textbook from the alternative supplier, where this cost could represent the cost of 
shipping, search costs, transactions costs, etc. Consumer i ’s additional cost of buying the book from 
the alternate supplier is wi, where wi 5 uvi and 0 , u , 1. Then, consumer i
 ’s marginal utility (gain) 
when it buys from a local bookstore is vi 2 PS , and consumer i
 ’s marginal utility when it buys from 
an alternative supplier is vi 2 PI 2 wi .
The bookstore is a local monopolist and its marginal cost of providing an additional unit 
is c, where c , v max. The textbook price PI at the alternative supplier is determined in a competitive 
market and the bookstore takes it as given when choosing its own price level. Then, consumer i buys 
the textbook from the local bookstore if: 
vi $ PS and vi 2 PS $ vi 2 wi 2 PI (1)
Condition (1) can be further simplified as shown below.  
vi $ PS and vi $ (PS 2 PI)/u (2)
Consumer i buys the textbook from the alternative supplier if: 
vi $ wi 1 PI and vi 2 PS , vi 2 wi 2 PI  (3)
Then, the demand function for the bookstore is: 
D(PS) 5 1 2 F ((PS 2 PI)/u) if PS $ PI /(1 2 u) and D(PS) 5 1 2 F (PS) if PS # PI /(1 2 u) (4)
It is clear that D(PS) is continuous in PS. The store’s profit function is p(PS) 5 D(PS) (PS 2 c) and the 
store’s optimization problem is shown below. 
Max ( )( )
[ ]maxP c, v
S S
S
D P P c

  (5)
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Because the domain of PS is complete and because the profit function is continuous in PS, the optimi-
zation problem described in (5) has a solution. Suppose there is a solution such that PS* . PI /(1 2 u). 
Then, the first- and second-order conditions are shown below. 
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3. Results and Discussion
Proposition 1. Suppose there is an interior solution PS* . PI /(1 2 u) such that conditions (6) and (7) 
are satisfied in the neighborhood of PS*. 
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Proof of proposition 1. 
Using the implicit function theorem, the formula for dP dS*/ u  is:
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Because p0 , 0 and (PS* 2 PI) . 0, dP dS*/ 0u.  if condition (i) holds. Similarly, dP dS*/ 0u,  if condition 
(ii) holds. 
Using the implicit function theorem, the formula for dP dPS I*/  is:
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Because p0 , 0, dP dPS I*/ 0.  if condition (i) holds. Similarly, dP dPS I*/ 0,  if condition (ii) holds. 
Proposition 1 has important implications when analyzing the effects of the HEOA that 
requires academic institutions to supply textbook information on their courses at the time students 
register for courses. The rationale for the provision is that it reduces u by giving students extra 
time to purchase the textbook from suppliers other than a college or university textbook store. 
Contrary to this argument, decrease in u would increase the price of textbook prices if condition 
(ii) of proposition 1 holds. To understand this result, suppose u decreases. Then, lower valuation 
consumers are more likely to switch to an alternative supplier, while higher valuation consumers 
are likely to stick with the local textbook store. Then, the local textbook store either reduces its 
price in order to hold on to some of its lower paying customers or tries to maximize its profits by 
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concentrating on higher valuation customers. When the store concentrates on serving higher valu-
ation customers, it increases its price in response to a decrease in u. Similarly, when the price of 
an alternative supplier decreases, the local store’s price may decrease or increase depending on 
the shape of the demand function. 
It is important to highlight that condition (i) in proposition 1 holds if f9 $ 0. For example, con-
dition (i) holds when vi is distributed according to a uniform distribution. Condition (ii) holds only if 
f9 , 0.
Proposition 1 described the store’s behavior when PS* . PI /(1 2 u). This condition is satisfied 
when c is high enough, for example, when c $ PI /(1 2 u). Now, consider the store’s choices when 
PS* , PI /(1 2 u). Then, the first- and second-order conditions for profit maximization are shown below. 
p     ( *) ( ( *)) ( *)( * )P F P f P P cS S S S1 0 (10)
p ( *) ( *) ( *)( * )P f P f P P cS S S S= − − −2 0  (11)
When PS* , PI 
 /(1 2 u), the store’s price is low enough, so that consumers don’t switch to an alterna-
tive supplier. Under these conditions, as described in proposition 2 below, small changes in u and 
PI do not have an effect on the local store’s pricing policy. 
Proposition 2. Suppose there is an interior solution PS* such that c , PS* , PI /(1 2 u) and conditions 
(10) and (11) are satisfied in the neighborhood of PS*. Then, dP dS*/ u5 0 anddP dPS I*/ 5 0. 
Proof of proposition 2. 
Using the implicit function theorem, 
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4. Conclusion
The theoretical model presented in this paper implies that the HEOA does not necessarily reduce 
textbook prices in college and university bookstores and could even increase textbook prices under 
some conditions. Because the act’s rationale does not hold in a simple model described in this paper, 
it is unlikely that the act’s rationale would hold in more complicated models. Further research could 
extend the model and investigate the act’s longer-term effect in a dynamic framework. In addition, 
since the theoretical model provides ambiguous prediction, further research could empirically study 
the effects of the HEOA. 
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